University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions

The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection

5-3-1943

Sipper v. Urban
Roger J. Traynor

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Sipper v. Urban 22 Cal.2d 138 (1943).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/106

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

,

:

70'-/6-\
138

SIPPER V. URBAN

[22 C.2d

May 1943]

SIPPER V. URBAN

139

[22 C.2d 138]

unless the defendants are able to show a different state of
facts than that which both the plaintiffs and defendants n.ow
agree is before the court in the present action.
This 'was the' precise question argued by each of the parties'
before the District Court of Appeal and decided by that
court. It was the precise and only question before us when
we granted a hearing after the decision of the District Court
of Appeal; and it is the only queStion raised by the parties in
their respective briefs. The failure of the trial court to make
a finding. as . to whether. the father was operating the automobile' at tlie time Of the accident with the consent of his
son was. not raiSed in any. manner by either of the parties,'
a~d cpnsequentljr has not been either argued or briefed by
elt1;ier of them. For these. reasons I renew my assertion that
~he ~resellt opinion is entirely inadequate to dispose of the
lSsuesbefore us.
.i
';:(iirther Un~ble to agree with the statement in the.
f6regpil;ig 'opinion that "Indeed, the creation of the Co-ownership" imelfmay not have been by mutual consent. It could
a~is,e ,by, operation of law,- as by vesting of title. by descent.. "
TNs pOSsibly might have been a defense to the action. It
~ould only have been raised by the defendants. No~ only have
~hl~,'d;~fend~nt~· .n6tinade this defense, but they expressly;
~ate l~ theIr, D:rle~ that the purchase price of the. aut()mobi1:e
was' paId for by both the father and the son. This admission.
~~~l?,p'~eclude any theory that the automobile was acquired
~!;t~~,;co-owner~ except by mutual consent.
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ALB,ERT' ABRAHAM SIPPER, Appellant,
CLARENCE
. URBAN" as; ~eal Estate Commissioner, etc., Respondent. .
[1]

Brokers.~Licenses-Review-Mandamus._In a mandamus
proceedlng to compel vacation of an order of the Real Estate
Commissioner suspending a broker's license, it is incumbent

:. [1] See. •.3 Oal.Jui'. Ten-year SuPP. 227, 239; 16: Oal.Jur. 768;
8 Am.~uf~ .993;' 34 Am.Jur. 830.
'., .
.
, McK. Dig. Reference; [1, 2] Brokers, § 8. .
",i

i'

.upon the petitioner to state a prima facie case entitlillg-. him
to relief. .He is not entitled to the writ as a matter of nght~L
but its issuance involves consideration of its' effect in promot"'
. ing justice and in turn the trial court mny determine'that,
the commi;sioner has not abused his discretion..
. ..' l
[2] Id.::.....Licenses-Review-Discretion of Oommissioner.---Thel
trial court. did not abuse its discretion in denying: an ,altern~-{
tive' writ of mandate to compel' the Real :Estate . Commis~.
sioner to vacate an order suspending.a ,broker's H6e~e,~,w.~er;~l
there was sufficient evidence to support. the, ~omml~~,lon.~r s.
findings that petitioner had s?ld realpropertyi f,bf;~pOu.~ ,~O'?i
more than the authorized prIce, and had secured . that .~dd~~ .
tional amourit in a second trust deed in his'favor, withottt
the owner's knowledge or consent..
'
•J, ' . :
'n .
.:: ::.~
. . ....\

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior' Courtof.Los
Angeles Comity. EmmetH. Wilson, Judge. Affirmed.
Proceeding in mandamus to compel vacation .of. an order of
the Real Estate Commissioner suspending license of. real. estate broker. Judgment denying relief affirmed. '
!

'Silverman & Hindin and Maurice J. Hindin.for Appellant.
Earl Warren, Attorney General, Rohert W. Kelljly,Ati~~~
ney General, and Bayard Rhone, Deputy Attorney General,
for Respondent.
SIIENK, J.-The p~titioner filed in the s:uperior courthi~
application for the writ, of mandamus to compel the respondent Real Estate Commissioner to vacate. an order .dated .Sep~
tember 19, 1941, suspending his license from Septembe:r 29,
1941, to and. including October 9, 1941, or a period of. ten
days, and, to set aside the findings on which the. order of stJ.spension was .based. The record does not disclose tlle date of
the filing of the original petition for the writ, but),t. is:cpn:-:
ceded that it was filed after the period of suspension had ex~
pired and the license of the petitioner presumably had beell
reinstated.,
On O~tober 23, 1941, the commissioner issued an.orde~
directing the petitioner to show cause why his~cense shoul:d
110t be suspended or revoked on the ground . that he had, en~
gaged in business as a real estate operator. ~urinR the t!'lll;
day period in violation of the order of suspenSIOn of Septem-,
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ber 19,
1941.
.The hearing on the. order to show cause was
.. set
for November 5, 1941. On January 2, 1942, the, petltlOner
filed an amended petition for the writ wherein he sought the
relief prayed for in the original petition and also prayed
that the commissioner be directed to dismiss the proceedings
cOinmenced' by him to further suspend or to revoke the license.
By stipulation the hearing set for November 5, 1941, on the
order to show cause was continued to a date to be fixed on
motion of the commissioner.
In addition to the foregoing the petitioner alleged that the
findings and order of the commissioner were not based on any
"sufficient, adequate or competent evidence to s~p~ort"
them j that the order was void, and that the commISSIoner
exceeded his authority in making it. It is then alleged that
there was filed concurrently with the petition a certified
transcript of the proceedings and hearing before the como,
missioner· that said transcript was referred to and made a
part of the petition without prejudice to the petitioner's right
to a re-examination of the evidence and the witnesses in court.
The petition together with the record of the proceedings
before the commissioner, was presented to the trial court on
the application for an alternative writ. The trial court examined the allegations of the petition and the record of the
proceedings taken before the commissioner and concluded
that'the same did not present facts justifying the issuance of
an alternative writ and entered an order of denial. The appeal
is from that order as an order finally disposing of the controversy in the trial court.
The record of the evidence before the commissioner, which
as indicated was submitted as a part of the petition, shows
the following:
The petitioner was a lice:bSed real estate broker operating in
Los Angeles County. He was cited to appear before the Real
Estate CommisSioner on August 21,1941, to answer charges of
conduct which, if true, would require the suspension or revocation of his license. After a hearing, findings, were made
by the commissioner to the effect that the petitioner had sold
a parcel of real, property pursuant to the owner's authorization, but for about $200 more than the authorized, price, and
had secured that additional amount in a second deed of trust
in his own favor, without the knowledge or consent of the
owner, and to accomplish his purpose drafted two different
sets of instructions to the escrow officer. The commissioner's
: i;
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conclusion was that the petitioner was guilty of con~uct
which constituted dishonest dealing, and that, his' license
should be suspended for ten days from' the effective date of
the order, as above stated.
," "
,
[1] On the appeal the petitioner cont~nds ~hat the t~Ial
court erred to his prejUdice in not accordmg hIm a he~rmg
on his petition. In this the petitioner may not be sust~Ined;
In his application for a writ it was incumbent upon hIm to
state a prima facie case entitling him torelief. This w?uld,be
true on any theory that may be advanced for a court mqUlry
into the lawfulness of the action of -the commissioner. The
petitioner is not entitled to the writ as a matter of right, but
its issuance involves consideration of its effect in promoting
justice (Wiedwald v. Dodson, 95 Cal. 450 [30 P. 580].; Betty
v. Superior Oourt, 18 Cal.2d 619 [116 P.2d 947] ; BarlkoZomae
Oil Oorp v. Superior Oourt, 18 Ca1.2d 726. [117 !».2d 67~] ;
16 Cal.Jur. p. 768 and cases cited), and m turn the trIal
court may determine that the commissioner has not abused his
discretion; (Newport v. Oaminetti, 56 Cal.App.2d 557 [132
P .2d 897].) [2] On the allegations of the petition ~ndt~e ;ecord
before the commissioner in the present proceedmg, It 18 concluded'that no abuse of discretion has anywhere been shown,
Indeed the oral and documentary evidence in the record before the commissioner and before the trial court would not
admit of a contrary conclusion.
The order is affirmed.
Curtis, J., and Carter, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment.
The California Real Estate Act, section 12(b), provides
that judicial review of decisions of the Real. Estate Com~~~
sioner shall be by writ of review as defined, m Code of CIvIl
Procedure, part III, title I, chapter 1. (Deering's Gen. Laws,
vol. I, p. 30.) So long as this procedure is not held unconstitutional the present proceeding' in mandamus should be
dismissed as unwarranted under the Real Estate Act. In any
event this case, cannot be fitted into the new mandamUs proceedi~g to restore a suspended license. The period, of suspension had expired when the proceedings were be~, and
the petitioner could not therefore pray. for a restO'ration of
;'.1

I!
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his license. He originally prayed to have the record of the
commissioner expunged. When the second proceeding was
undertaken to suspenll further or revoke his license because
of his alleged disregard of the first suspension, he brought
an action in the nature of a bill to enjoin the further proceedings, constrained into the form of a mandamus proceeding, setting forth that the decision of the commissioner in
the first proceeding to suspend his license was erroneous on
issues of fact. No decision was reached in the second proceeding. The majority opinion assumes that the only issue
is the correctness of the commissioner's decision in the first
proceeding.
The petitioner demanded the privilege of introducing
additional evidence, but the trial court acted exclusively on
the record of evidence taken by the commissioner and made
the following minute order, "The Court having read and
considered the entire record of the evidence introduced and
the proceedings had before respondent, finds that there is
sufficient competent evidence to sustain the decision and the
implied findings of respondent and the order suspending
petit~oner's license and finds no reason for annulling said
order: The petition for writ of mandate is denied." The
majority, opinion holds that the superior court judge had
4isc~etio~ to deuy an alternative writ of mandamus when
he found that there ~,~s sufficient competent evidence in the
record before the commissioner to support his findings and
order, and that he thus had discretion to grant a review that
has the scope of a certiorari review. The present decision
is contrary to that in Laisne v. Oalifornia State Board of
Optometry, 19 Ca1.2d 831 [123 P.2d 457], where the trial
judge was reversed fo~ not admitting new evidence, even
though he found suffiClent evidence in the administrative
record to support the findings and order.
It is clear from the majority opinion that had the review
in the present case been by certiorari as required by the Real
Estate Act the result would have been the same-the cOmmissioner's decision would have been sustained on the ground
that there was sufficient evidence in his record to sustain his
decision. It is therefore unnecessary to dissent from the
judgment.
Gibson, C. J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.
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SCHAUER, J.-I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice
Shenk.
This case presents to me, for the first time as a member
of this court, the much mooted question as to what should,
be the policy of the courts of this state (until and unless
the people act by express constitutional amendment) with
respect to the scope of judicial review of admjnistrative board
proceedings. We definitely are not concerned with any problem of policy as to the extent of judicial power which should
be given to administrative agencies. The people of the state '
when they see fit may, and in such instances as those of the
Industrial Accident Commission and the Railroad' Commis-'
siOli they have seen fit to, delegate substantially full ,judicial
power to such agencies. Weare conMrned only With fhe poz.'
icy of the scope of judicial review whichshaZZ
exercised in
respect of state-wide agencies to which such judicial power:
has not been extended by constitutiontilamendment. That
our decision has some relevancy to the finality of proceedings
before such agencies is but incidental in the determination of.
our primary problem. The question comes as orieof, lawo:n
opposing contentions, voiced in this case by Mr. JnsticeShenk
on the one hand and Mr. Justice Traynor on the'other,i,as
to whether the procedure known as mandamus or that denoni~
inated certiorari is the proper medium for review ofsucli
proceedings. A more detailed enunciation of' thereapective
views of the authors of the above~me!tioned prevailing and
concurring opinions herein is found in Dare'v~ Boo;rii of'Medical Examiners (1943), 21 CaL2d790' [136 P.2d 304] ..
The arguments in favor of certiorari and of the pI'mci~
pIes upon which its applicability would depend ·'also find
most able and convincing delineation in thedissEmting opinion
of Mr. Chief Justice Gibson in Laisne v.' State Bd: olOptoin~
etry (1942), 19 Ca1.2d 831, 848 [123 P.2d457].Had I been
a member of the court at the time the 'Laisne c~e was 'de.
cided, I am impressed with the belief that the accurate his.
torical recitals, the clear logic, and the practical philosophy
of the Chief Justice, as expressed in his dissent in that case,
would in all probability have led me to concur in the con:..
clusion he advocated, as opposed to the, extreme p6sition theri
taken by the majority. But there are three considerations
which now impel me to support, ~n effect, th~ majority"view:

be
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(1) The complete trial de novo doctrine of the Laisne case
has been abandoned; (2) The question of whether or n~t
mandamus is ~ proper remedy is no longer an open one;'
(3) The questlon fundamentally is more a matter of state
policy tl).an of abstract law, and California is cominitted to
the broader policy.
1 .• The complete trial de nQVO doctrine of the Laisne case
has been abandoned. By the decision in the Dare case (Dare
v. Board of Medical Examiners, supra) the majority of the
court has receded from the extreme position taken in the
Laisne ?ase with respect to the right of a party to a complete tn~l' de novo on mandamus review, and has thereby
s~bsta~tlal1y .rectified perhaps the most serious of the prac. tlcal dlfncultles suggested in the dissenting opinion in the
Laisne case as bound to be encountered in practice under
the majority rule as then stated. The. procedure as now declared gives the reviewing court the power and duty of exercising an independent judgment as to both facts and law,
but contemplates that the record· of the administrative board
s~all. come befor? the cour~ endowed with a strong presumptlon In favor of ltS regularlty and propriety in every respect
a?d that the burdens~all rest upon the petitioner to support
hls challenge affirmatlvely, competently, and convincingly.
In other words, rarely, if ever, will a board determination
~e disturbed unles~ the petitioner is able to show a jurisdictlOnal excess, a serlOusterror of law, or an abuse of discretion
on the fa.cts. T~i~ ~s in full accord with the presumption
declared In subdlVlslon 15 of section 1963 of the Code of
Civil P~?cedu~e, "That official d~ty has been regularly performed. • It lS, of course, also Inherent in the mandamus
remedy that the right of the petitioner to the initial issuance
o! th~ writ is not absolute. His right to make the applicatlon lS absolute but the application implicitly calls for the
exercise of judicial discretion, and within the limits of that
discretion (for definition of judicial discretion, see Gossman
v. Gossman (1942), 52 Cal.App.2d 184, 194-195 [126 P.2d
178]) the writ may be granted or withheld as the facts
averred in and ci~c~stanc~ appertaining t~ each particular case may reqUlre, In the Interests of sound justice.
2. The question of whether or not mandamus is a proper
remedy ~s no longer an open one. Right or wrong, as abstract
legal phIlosophy, the mandamus method of review has been
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repeatedly affirmed as the only tenable Rnd availabl~proce
dure for the review of state board .proceedings. (See Stand~
ard Oil 00. v. State Board of Equal. (1936), 6 Ga1.2d.<, 557 ,
[59 P.2d 119] j Whitten v. State Bd. of Optometry (193.7),
8 Cal.2d 444 [65 P.2d 1296, 115A.L.R.l] ; Drummey v.. State..
Bd. of Funeral Directors (1939), 13 Cal.2d 75 [87 P.2d 848];
McDonough v. Goodcell (1939),13 CaL2d 74L[91!l.2dJO~5,.
123 A.L.R. 1205] ; Laisne v. State Bd. of Optometry (1942),
supra, 19 Cal.2d 831 [123 P.2d 457] j Dare v. Bd. olMedicaZ Examiners (1943), s1tpra, 21 Ca1.2d 790 [136 P.2d 304J;
RUssell v. Miller (1943), 21Ca1.2d 817 [136 P.2d 318].)
I do not believe that courts of last resort should, lightly
skip from side to side of a procedural fence on every change
in their personnel. Certainly I do not mean. that precedent
should be followed to the point of strangulation of progress or perpetuation of harming error, but as to the declaration of judicial procedures in such cases as those under
discussion, by which vested constitutional rights of individual
persons are to be lost or defended, I am of the opinion that
certainty of the method may be of greater public importance
than its technical soundness, where the asserted unsoundness
lies not so much in its operation as in its historical or theoretical derivation. In other words, assuming that error has
been committed and applying the test stated in Houghton v;
Austin (1874),47 Cal. 646, 667, it seems likely here "that it
will produce more of evil than of good to restore the law"
to its former status. This conclusion finds implied support in
the language of the Chief Justice in his Laisne case dissent,
where (atp. 854 of 19 Ca1.2d), in discussing the use of
mandamus prior to the declaration of the extreme trial de
novo theory of the majority in that case, he says, "So long
as it was possible, by use of the writ of mandate, to evolve
a proper relationship between the courts and administrative
agencies, it did not seem essential to insist upon a return to
the historically correct procedure from which the court had
strayed. " The Dare case decision appears to me to substantially re-establish a "proper relationship \between the courts
and administrative agencies."
3. The question as to the scope of judicial review of administrative board proceedings is inherently more a matter
of state policy than of abstract law, and the State of Oali:
fornia is committed to the broader policy. It is not disputed

.
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that the 9.uestion as to the scope which judicial review of deCisions of administrative officers and boards shall take is a'
matter more essentially and fundamentally of policy than
of abstl'act law. That there shall be some judicial review of
snch decisions is implicit in our system of government. Still
substantially true and pertinent in fact, if not technically
in all respects in law, is the declaration of this court as to
administrative board proceedings made in People ex rel. Whitney v. Board of Delegates of the S. F. Fire Department
(1860), 14 Cal. 479, 499: "As these were judicial questions,
we must regard the Board itself as exercising judicial func-'
tions, and as exercising such functions in subordination and
subjection to the control and supervision of the Courts in
the manner provided by law. It would be a reproach to' the
jurisprudence of the State, if the arbitrary, wanton, and illegal, exercise of such powers were beyond the remedial interposition of the Courts."
In view of the extended and able narration and expositicln, in the recent cases previously cited, of the history, theory,
and development of the law on the subject, a reiteration or
attempted extension of such discussions would serve no useful
purpose here. It is appropriate, however, to sketch some of
the fundamental concepts out of and upon which our policy
has developed, and, with a view toward possible ultimate
legislative clarification of the procedure, to point out some
?f the difficulties which have beset this court in its efforts to
afford unrelenting protection to the people in their constitutional rights and at the same time to preserve for them to a
substantial degree the benefits. in efficiency of administra~
tion offered by properly functioning and supervised administrative agencies.
In the first place, intellectual integrity requires a frank
con~ession that the p:ocedure known as certiorari (provided
for In chapter 10f t1tle 1 of part III of the Code of Civil
Procedure) appears from the academic standpoint to be that
which traditionally would be appropriate to review of administrative board decisions. But the deduction clearly to be
drawn from a perspective view of the whole forest of cases
on the subject is that certiorari, strictly limited to its commonlaw fut;tction; does not constitute. a vehicle adequate to carry
the polIcy of the people of this state to the goal of the broad
judicial review of state-wide administrative board decisions
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which they' desire as a bulwark against arbitraJ!Y dep~iva~ion
of vested property rights. They, by our state ConstItutIon,
have divided the powers of governm.ent "into. th:e.e ~~parate
departments-the legislative, executIVe, and Ju?iClal (Cal.
Const., art. III, sec. 1), the judicial power. beIng express!y
"vested in the Senate, sitting as.a court of Impea~hment, In
a Supreme Court, District Courts of App:al, S~perlOr C?urts,
such municipal courts as may be establIshed III any.cIty or
city and county, and such inferior co.urts as the Legislat~re
may establish in any incorporated CIty or town, townshIp,
county or city and county. " (CaL Const., art. VI, sec. 1.)
This is fundamental policy.
.
Despite this theoretical division of p~wers the fact remaIns
that each of the three departments IS but 'supplementary
to the others, the aggregate making up our sc~eme of government and in the carrying on of the complex bUSIness of government' it is inevitable that each department in exerci~ing the
power peculiarly vested in it shall make u~e ?f certaIll tunc-.
tions which inherently are more characterIstIc of the .pou:er
of other departments. In this connection both the ~X~CUtIV~
(administrative) and legislative departmen~ neces~arilycarry
on activities in which they receive and weIgh eVIdence, .consider the law relative thereto, and come to conclusion~ thereo~.
The basic powers of each department are essentIally disparate in character and, in most of their, activities, the ~arry
ing on of the business of the several departments admIts. of
the incidental use of certain limited tunctions,of the others
without encroachment upon' the basic powers. of 'such others,
but in administrative board cases (the board functioning in
the executive department of government), where an ,indivi~.
ual is subjected to a trial and by judgment of the. b9a:d IS
to be deprived of a property right, a diffi~u~t problem IS .,a~
once apparent. If the proceedings and deCISIon of th,e ?oar4.
are given absolute finality as to both fact and la~, It JS o~~
vious that the full judicial power has be.en exerClsed·. ThIS
unquestionably would be destructive of the bll,sic constitutional concept of division of pOwers and has, not been .advocated in entirety by the exponents of the minority view. They
do however, contend that the Legislature has the power under.
th~ Constitution to confer upon an administrative b9ard th~
authority to make a final determination of. issues, of fac~ ~~

....
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conflicting evidence, and that in such cases the determinations
should be vulnerable to attack on review only if it is shown
that the board has' acted arbitrarily or capriciously or that
the determination is not supported by substantial evidence.
In technical consistency, since they espouse certiorari as the
remedy, it would seem that they should also contend that err~rs. in law and irregularities in procedure within the jurisdIctIon of the board are not subject to correction on review.
I infer, however, as is pointed out more particularly herein~
arter, that they conceive for certiorari a scope which includes
the power to correct "serious errors" in law. The majority
of ~he court has insisted that the limited scope of review
avaIlable under certiorari would be inadequate to serve the
interests of justice or protect constitutional rights of individuals. In the Laisne case they went to the extreme of holding
that o~ly a comp~et~ trial de novo would suffice to protect
such rIghts. But It IS at once apparent that if a substantial
amount of finality is not accorded board determinations, substantially all the benefits of the whole administrative board
procedure. are lost. This fact, pointed out in the Laisne dissent, has been recognized by the majority in the Dare case.
The difficulty lies (a) in fixing a reasonable and workable
boundary and (b) in finding or developing a procedure suited
to the ~ro~le~. . Whe~her. the bounda~y shall be set strictly
at the JurIsdIctIonal InqUIry of certiorari, shall go to the
other extreme and encompass a complete trial de novo or
shall find a middle ground with strong presumptions in f~vor
?f the board determi~ations,. giving them the effect of finality
In most cases but WIth ultImate power in the courts inde~
penden~ly to consider the evidence and the law, is obviously
a questIon of governmental policy.
A;> previously indicated, I do not understand that the minorIty freely and unqualifiedly advocates certiorari in its
strictly limited common-law scope as the most desirable form
or procedure for review of proceedings of the type under
discussion. This is indicated in the statement of the Chief
Justice in the Laisne case dissent (19 Ca1.2d at p. 868) that
"'Yhere there is neither a constitutional nor statutory reqUIrement that a court make the determination of fact or
reweigh the evidence upon which the administrative agency
acted, th? duty of the judicial branch is adequately fulfilled
by a reVIew upon certiorari which extends to the questions
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of law involved. A review upon the iss~es of law woul~,. o:t
course, include such questions as whether the, agency
regularly pursued the authority vested in it,~peth~r,it~as
acted arbitrarily and whether there is subst~fi.tI,~I,.eVldeneeto;
support its determinations of fact. Ourd~c'tS'/,o~s. havere,co.g~ .
nized that administrative rulings on quest'l.Ons ol)a'/J)c~nno';
be accorded finality. Such questions may bedeierrirlned'conclusively only by a court exercising constitut~onal judicial,.
power. . [Citation.] Upon issues of ract,how~ver,~he~e,
there is no constitutional requirement that. the ~!lcts be J~!II';;, .
cially determined and no statutory indication that the reVIew
WaB meant to extend to a re-exa~ina~~on of ques~ion~ of ~act, :fu.e
court should' uphold the admimstratIve determIna~lOn uriless It
is found that there is no substantial evidence to s)lpport the:finding.' , (Italics added.) A similar implication that certio~ari,in
administrative board reviews, should and could accomplIsh the
correction of errors at law is found iII: Mr. Justice Traynor's
concurring and dissenting opinion in the DlI;re c~e.. He ~ays
(at p. 805 of 21 CaL2d): "In an actual cert~orarl proceedIng,
the court would be confined to the record of the proceedings
before the administrative board, and the board's determination would be quashed if the record disclosed that the board
had acted outside its jurisdiction, or had made serious errors
of law in the exercise thereof, or that its decision was not supported by substantial evidence." (Italics added.) Thus it seems
that to overcome a board determination approximately the same
showing is necessary whether we. procee? under ~he ~ajo:ity
view in the Dare case or in complIance WIth the mInorIty VIew.
For all practical purposes the only substantial difference between the two advocated procedures is that in the one CaBe
(the minority plim) the party is confined to t~e :ecord in
making his showing, and in the other (the maJorIty plan)
the party in making a legally equivalent showing may go
beyond the record.
.
The solution of the problem as to what shall be the vehicle
for review, if it is to go beyond the jurisdictional inquiry,
should, I believe, within constitutional limits, pereferably be
furnished by the Legislature. This, however, brings us peril~
ously close to a constitutional problem, as will be noted later.
That the people may in any ease by constitutional amendment
vest judicial power in a board, as ?as bee?, done with .th~ Ra?road Commission and the IndustrIal AccldeIl:t COlllD11SS1on, lS,

bas.
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of course, elementary. Our problem is limited to situations
where there has been no such express delegation of constitutional authority. .
.
So far as this case is concerned, the pertinent question is
whether mandamus or certiorari is the appropriate medium
for the. assertion of petitioner's claims. It will appear that if
the polI~y of the State requires any more than a jurisdictional
review certiorari is not adequate; in other words, if either
the extreme liberal procedure of a trial de novo, or the middle
ground above defined, is to be employed, mandamus is the
only presently available and possibly tenable procedure.
Neit?er certiorari nor mandamus, however, without expressly
applIcable rules of procedure, appears to constitute an ideal
vehicle. Both writs have useful functions in the field of jurisprudence. but, archaic in their inceptions, neither was originally de~l~ed to furnish a review procedure adequate to the
compleXItIes of modern government in its use of administrative agencies.
The code section governing certiorari (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1068) provides that "A writ of review may be granted by
any court, except a municipal, police or justice's court when
a~ inferior tribunal, board, or officer, exercising judiciai functwns, has exceeded the jurisdiction of such tribunal board or
officer, ~nd there is no appeal, nor, in the judgment of the co~rt,
anY'p'lam, speedy, and adequate remedy." (Italics added.) In
additlOn to the jurisdictional limitation implicit in the
language above quoted, the scope of the inquiry on this writ
is limited expressly by section 1074 of the same code: "The
review upon this writ cannot be extended further than to
determine whether the inferior tribunal, board, or officer has
regularly pursued the authority of such tribunal board or
officer." It is, I believe, because of such limitati~ns on the
sc.ope of the. re~ew p.er:nis~ible. under certiorari, coupled
With th.e cons~ltutlOnalllJ:rlltatlOn (whatever it may be) on the
authonty WhICh the LegtSlature may delegate to such board;:;'
that the majority of the court, in carrying out what it regarded
as the best policy for this State in the scope of the review of
administrative board proceedings, has resorted to the procedure
of mandamns, which at. common.law "was employed asa supplemental and extraordmary wrIt of a remedial character and
was early resorted to from the necessity of establishi~g a
method to be used on occasions where the law had provided no

,t
I.'

other remedy, and where in justice there ought to be one, upon
the principle that no right should be without a remedy" (16
Cal.Jur. 764, sec. 4).
Section 1085 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that
the writ of mandate'" may be issued . . . to any inferior
tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an act· which the law specially enjoins, as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station; or to compel the
admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which he is entitled, and from which heisunlaw~
fully precluded by such inferior tribunal, corporation, board
or person."
.
This writ has come to be a sort of residuary legatee for
judicial powers and procedures not otherwise. specifically disposed of by constitution or statute, but by the very nature of
its universality it leaves much to the ingenuity of the courts
in administering it and likewise much to the conjecture of
administrative boards and officers as to the procedure they
may follow under its beneficent but uncertain supervision.
As to the legislative constitutjonal problem previously
mentioned, we may recognize that the Legislature cannot
make certiorari applicable to non-judicial boards (Standard
Oil Co. v. State Board of Equal. (1936), supra, 6 CaUd 557
[59 P.2d 119]) and that it cannot add to or subtract from
the jurisdiction expressly and ex.clusively vested in certain of
the courts enumerated in section 1 of article VI of theCali~
fornia Constitution,but this does not preclude it from setting up a form or forms of procedure in the ,nature of the
mandamus review which· has been' developed. So long' as it
does not add to or subtract from the courts' constitutional
powers, express or inherent, it. may prescribe regulat.ions
which would constitute a guide for the public, the admiIiistrative officers, and the courts. It should not· be necessary:.for
this court to .have to improvise rules of procedure for review
of the .decisions of any of the several boards of'theState, as
:is trenched upon in the Dare case, yet the need for' such rules
is patent. It seems highly. probable that :many of theseemmgly arbitrary pra~ticesof such agencies and many oftheclaimSt
of injustice, to individuals would be obviated if· there !were:
legislativelyestablishedstan:dards and plans: ofoprocedul'e,[
governing both the ~nitia,l proce~c;ling$; .andthe:r.evi~:thereof,r
JuiOwD. alike to' the courts and boards and known by or avail-
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able to the pUblic. Not the least of the beneficiaries of such
legislation would be the boards and officers themselves, most
of whom are striving diligently and conscientiously to serve
the public despite the uncertainties of the procedures which
they have attempted to follow and to which they have been
subjected.
In the first volume of California Reports the difficulties of
this court in the use of the writs of certiorari alid of mandamus appear to have commenced. It was stated in People ex
reZ. Field v. Turner (1850), 1 Cal. 152, 156, that "As a gen.
eral rule, at common law, where error has occurred in proceedings, either civil or criminal, which cannot be reached
by a writ of error, the writ of certiorari is a proper remedy to
correct such error, unless some other statutory remedy has been
given." (Italics added.) A similar mistaken view of the function of certiorari was indicated in People v. Hester (1856), 6
Cal. 679, 680. In People ex rel. Whitney v. Board of Delegates of the S. F. Fire Department (1860), supra, 14 Cal.
479, 499, 500, the previously expressed view was characterized as ",a very serious mistake in regard to the functions
of the writ at common law." It is also of interest to note,
that in People ex reZ. Mulford v. Turner (1850), 1 Cal. 143
[52 Am.Dec. 295J, the writ of mandate was given the function of requiring a district court to vacate an order of disbarment and to reinstate a firm of attorneys as members of
the bar. In People ex reZ. Field v. Turner (1850), supra,
the writ of mandate was applied for but the writ of certiorari was issued, apparently in the view that it was of
broader scope, in the premises, than mandate. The court
said "In this, it is sought merely to reverse a judgment of
the court. The mandamus must, therefore, be refused. . . .
We deem it proper to award a writ of certiorari. ... " That
the difficulties of the court in regard to proper functions
of the two writs were not ended by the Whitney case is
manifest, from the cases cited supra' under the second of my
reasons for the conclusion I have reached, as well as from
the preceding discussion herein.
The conclusion of this court on the policy of applying
the broader scope of mandamus to reviews of administrative board proceedings is likewise manifest from the cases
last mentioned. That such policy has received wide attention and public discussion beyond the volumes of law re-

ports is apparent from the citations in the concurring, and
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Traynor in Dare v. Board
of Medical Examiners (1943), supra, ~1 Cal.2d 790, 803 [~36
P.2d 304J. At the general election i~ !942 a proposed constltu.
tional amendment (S.C.A. 8, PropOSItIOn No. 16, G~neral Election Ballot, 1942) calling necessarily for an expreSSIOn ?f ~r?f:
erence on the question of policy as to the scope of JU~ICIa1
review of decisions by administrative officers, was submItted.
to the people of this State. The general.e~ectof the ,pro~
posed amendment would have been ~o limit the, scopeol
'judicial review in such cases substantIally to ; ~ata:tf~r~e4
by the statutory limits of certiorari. On thIS proposItion;
on November 3, 1942, the people vote.d "y'es":' 323,558;
"No": 1,103,717. By this overwhelmIng vote the' ,peopl~
expressed their preference for the liberal policy followed ,by
the court as opposed to the narrower one proposed 1? them;
The State of California must therefore be, recognIZed as
committed to the broader policy encompassed by the man·
damus procedure.
The contest between certiorari and mandamus has not
been an idle one. The strong presentation of the minority
view has served a valuable purpose; its object has been substantially attained. The type of review procedure sanctioned by the majority in the Dare case appears to be an
evolutional product of the views and efforts of both the
majority and minority groups. Such procedure se~ms ~o
enVisage a thoroughly pract~c~l an.d proper. relatIonshIp
between the courts and admInIStratIve agenCIes., As previously suggested, there would be little difference as to re-,
sUIts obtained in practical operation whether under t~e D!lre
case mandamus plan or the certiorari plan of t~e mInor~ty.
We perhaps should recognize that we have. In practi~al
effect developed a special procedure for the. reVIew of ad.m~
istrative board 'proceedings. While questIons of, det~il In
procedure, as is characteristic ~ all legal or .quasl-Ieg~
proceedings, may from time to tIme lecur, partlc~arly. In
the absence of legislatively enacted rules, the b~SlC pol~cy
of the people of this state, as hereinabove depIcted, WIth
respect to the scope of the review of administrative board
proeeedings should, I believe, now. be accepted by us and
henceforth regarded as settled, until and unless the people,
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whoin rests the full and final power, ordain. otherwise

by eXpress constitutional amendment.

. As to .this particular case, regardless of the right purportedly given petitioner by the provisions of section 12 (b)
of. the California Real Estate Act (Deering's Gen. Laws
(1937), Act 112, p. 30, at p. 40) to seek a review pursuant
to the provisions of Chapter I of Title I' of Part III of the
Code of Civil Procedure (certiorari) and. whether or not
such type of review could be lawfully ordained by the Legislature (see Standard Oil Co.v. State Board of Equal. (1936),
supra, 6 Ca1.2d 557 [59 P.2d 119J), he also had the right (available to all persons) to petition for the remedy of his own
choosing (mandamus) . Whether his petition stated facts
entitling him to that remedy was a question of law and of
judicial discretion depending on the substance of the facts
stated;, it was a question which would not be concluded by
the mere existence of a possible alternative equitable procedure (see Sheehan v. Board of Police Commrs. (1920), 47
Cal.App. 29, 36 [190 P. 51J; Great Western Power Co. v.
Pillsbury (1915), 170 Cal. 180, 182-183 [149 P. 35]). The
discretion of the trial court is not shown to have been
abused.

[2]

[3]

[4]
[L. A. No. 18581.

In Bank.

May 3, 1943.J

SECURITY-FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF LOS ANGELES (a National Banking Association), Respondent, v.
BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST & SAVINGS ASSOCIATION (a National Banking Associa.
tion), Appellant.
[1] Negotiable Instruments-Form and Requisites-Payability to
, Bearer-Fictitious Payee-Existent Person.-The fact that
[1] When negotiable instruments deemed payable to fictitious

persons within statute that makes paper payable to bearer, note
18 A.L.R. 15. See, also, 19 Cal.Jur. 819; 7 Am.Jur. 840.
McK. Dig. Ref'!rences: [1,4] Negotiable Instruments § 13' [2J
~egotiable Instruments, § 41; Banks, § 107; [3] Neg~tiabl~ Instruments, § 159; [5, 6J Negotiable Instruments § 17' [7J Banks
§ 168.
"
,

[5]

[6]

checks are drawn to an actual person does not pre.ve?t his
name from being that of a fictitious payee, where It IS not
intended that he should have an interest therein. Such.8;
check, however, is not payable to bearer unless the ~act .that
the payee is fictitious is known "by the person makmg It so
payable!' (See Civ. Code, § 3090, subd. 3.)
ld.-Delenses-Forgery: Banks-Payment on Forged lnd?rsement.-A forged indorsement is ordinarily a nullity. It does
not pass title to a check, and a ba~k may not ~harge to the
account of its depositor a check pald on the baS1S of such, an
indorsement. A drawer, however, who intentionally makes, a
check payable to a fictitious payee, cannot obtain the benefit
of these rules as he knows that' the check will be indorsed
in the name ~f the payee by someone bearing another n~~e.
When the drawer entrusts an employee with the responSIbility of signing checks, the signer takes the place of the
drawer and his knowledge binds the drawer.
.
Id.~Checks-Rights and Liabilities-Fraud of Bookkeeper.Where the drawer of a check or his signer is. the vict~ of the
fraud of the bookkeeper who is charged wIth Elxammmg the
drawer's accounts and informing him of his liabilities, the
person buying or paying the check has no right to a r~l~a~e,
at the expense of the innocent drawer, from the responSIbilIty
of determining the authenticity of the indorsements.
ld.-Form and Requisites-Payability to Bearer-Fictitious
Payee-Knowledge of Employee.-Fictitious payee checks are
not payable to bearer unless the signer is aware ~f the fra~d.
This is true even though a bank officer .authorlZed to SIgn
checks signs them in reliance on vouchers of anoth.er employee,
whose fraud in preparing the vouchers automa~l?,ally led to
the officer's unwitting execution of checks to fictitIOUS payees.
ld.-Form and Requisites-Execution-Delivery.-Delivery of
a negotiable instrument is not essential to its execution. A
check is complete when received by the person who is to. deliver it, and lack of delivery is no defense against a holder
in due course. (See Civ. Code, § 3097.)
.
ld.-Form and Requisites-Execution-Delivery-Chec.k Payable to Fictitious Payee.-Ordinarily the signer remams the

[3] Who must bear loss as between drawer .-who delivers chee~.
to an impostor and one who cashes or pays It upon the latter 8'
indorsement note 22 A.L.R. 1228. See, also, 8 Am.Jur. 314.
. .•
[4] Inten~ and'knowl~dge of e~pl?yee or agent of person sought;
to be charged as affectmg ap~l~catlOn as to. latter rule. that n.e-.,
gotiable paper payable to fichtIOUS, person IS payable to bearer,
note, 74 A.L.R. 822. See, also, 7 Am.Jur. 844.

